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Abstract 
An effective corporate governance structure is as crucial to a public 
sector organisation as it is to a private sector organisation.  This paper 
reviews the profile of directors on governance boards of government 
controlled organisations and finds that, while the governance structures 
are similar with those in the private sector, the real power to set the 
strategic, financial and operational directions of these organisations is 
not in the hands of the directors, as it is in the private sector, but in the 
hands of the responsible ministers.  This de-coupling, it is argued, is due 
to the perception that private sector governance practices are superior to 
public sector practices and therefore these government organisations, in 
an attempt to maintain the appearance of good governance and to 
legitimise their place in society, have adopted on the surface private 
sector governance structures and practices.   
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The Australian public sector has undergone significant changes since 
the late 1980s.  Many of these changes can be viewed as responses to 
both internal and external institutional pressures to adopt private sector 
behaviours, processes and values in an attempt to appear legitimate to 
the people of Australia and [more importantly?] to the businesses which 
operate in Australia.   
Consistent with the private sector, the Australian Commonwealth 
Government has significantly increased its focus on corporate 
governance arrangements for Government, government departments, 
agencies, and statutory authorities.  For the Commonwealth Public 
Sector, corporate governance refers to “the processes by which 
organisations are directed, controlled and held to account.  It 
encompasses authority, accountability, stewardship, leadership, 
direction and control exercised in the organisation” (ANAO, 2003a, p. 6).  
This definition of public sector corporate governance is supported by 
Uhrig, who in his 2003 report1 explained that corporate governance is 
concerned with “the power of those in control of the strategy and 
direction of an entity … taking into account risk and the environment in 
which it is operating” (2003, p. 2). 
The Australian system of government is based upon the Westminster 
system, which originated in the United Kingdom, where the head of state 
is not the head of government, and the ministers from the governing 
political party, the executive, are from and accountable to the parliament 
(APH, 2003).  This paper will focus on one component of executive 
accountability to the parliament, the non-executive directors of the 
government-controlled Commonwealth Statutory Authorities.  The 2005–
06 Annual Reports of 19 material2 Commonwealth Statutory Authorities 
                                      
1 The Uhrig Report was based on a review of the corporate governance of 
Commonwealth Statutory Authorities and office holders.  The objective of the 
review was to identify issues surrounding existing governance arrangements and 
to provide options for Government, both to improve performance and to get the 
best from statutory authorities, office holders, and their accountability 
frameworks. For a list of the recommendations of the Uhrig Report refer to 
appendix 2. 
 
2 Material entities comprise 99% of revenues, expenses, assets and liabilities of all 
the Commonwealth Statutory Authorities (DOFA, 2007). 
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were reviewed to determine the following: mix of executive and non-
executive directors; gender of directors; highest level of qualification of 
directors; average length of service of directors; remuneration of non-
executive directors; and number of other directorships.  The findings are 
then reviewed in the context of the new managerialism environment 
which is engulfing the Australian Commonwealth public service. 
This paper examines the roles and mix of public sector non-executive 
directors through the lens of institutional theory.  Institutional theory has 
often been used to explain how private sector organisations react to 
socially rationalised concepts on the practices, procedures and 
structures of organisations.  However, with the recent focus on 
performance, efficiency and effectiveness in the public sector, 
institutional theory is becoming more appropriate in the evaluation of 
public sector organisations. 
Background 
The corporate governance structures of both public and private sectors 
have areas of commonality (Edwards, 2002, p. 52), particularly in 
relation to performance and the roles and responsibilities of their 
governing boards and executive.  For example the governing boards of 
organisations in both sectors include executive directors (directors who 
hold executive positions within the organisation) and non-executive 
directors (who come from outside the organisation).  For the public 
sector the increased focus on performance and responsibilities is 
consistent with the move to “new managerialism” in the public sector 
(Jackson and Lapsley, 2003, p. 360) and the perceived need of the 
public sector to improve its efficiency, effectiveness and accountability 
(Guthrie, 1998, p. 2; Barton, 2005, p. 138).  Dr Peter Boxall, the previous 
Secretary of the Commonwealth Department of Finance and 
Administration, explained the main objectives of new managerialism as 
encouraging a culture of performance and making the public sector more 
responsive to the needs of government (Boxall, 1998, p. 18).  These 
comments imply that the public sector before “new managerialism” was 
inefficient and unresponsive to the needs of the government and in turn 
unresponsive to the needs of the Australian public.  This follows from the 
common misconception that the best way for the public sector to 
improve its performance would be to adopt private sector behaviours 
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such as appointing governing boards of directors for some government 
organisations. 
One of the key processes required to develop an effective corporate 
governance structure in any organisation is the clarification of 
appropriate roles for management and for the board of directors (ASX, 
2003, p. 3).  While the roles and powers of directors on public sector 
boards appear similar to those of directors on private sector boards, 
there are fundamental differences.  The most significant difference is in 
relation to the level of power the directors have to act.  Directors on the 
board of a private sector company usually have both the full power to act 
and the responsibility to do so.  This includes the power to formulate and 
approve the strategy of the organisation and to develop and implement 
important company policies (Uhrig, 2003, p. 4).   
In contrast, a board [and its directors] governing a public sector 
organisation has limited power, primarily because government 
organisations are created for the implementation of established 
government policy and the realisation of intended outcomes (Uhrig, 
2003, p. 31).  The real power in a public sector organisation rests not 
with the board of directors, but with the responsible Minister who controls 
the appointment of board members, therefore influencing their behaviour 
and reducing the autonomy of boards (Howard and Seth-Purdie, 2005, 
p. 60).   
Regardless of the level of power and autonomy of public sector boards, 
they still need to ensure the corporate governance structures of their 
organisations enable them to effectively meet their responsibilities to 
their key stakeholders: Parliament, Government [particularly via the 
Departments of Finance and Administration, Treasury and Prime 
Minister and Cabinet], Ministers, public service officers and the 
Australian public.  To assist, the Australian National Audit Office has 
developed comprehensive Better Practice Guides for use amongst the 
public sector3.  These guides outline explicitly the frameworks, 
                                      
3  There is also specific legislation developed for Commonwealth Government 
entities which prescribes the required processes and functions that affect the 
governance of these entities.  This specific legislation includes [do these acts 
need to be in italics?] the Auditor-General Act 1997, the Public Service Act 1999 
(PS Act), the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (FMA Act), the 
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processes and practices government organisations should take to 
ensure their corporate governance arrangements meet the expectations 
of their key stakeholders and effectively discharge their accountabilities.   
Two specific pieces of legislation have been enacted to outline the 
financial reporting requirements and financial accountabilities for 
Commonwealth government organisations.  The first, the Financial 
Management and Accountability Act 1997, provides the “framework for 
the proper management of public money and public property by the 
Executive arm of the Commonwealth” (DOFA, 2006).  The second, the 
Commonwealth Authorities and Corporations Act 1997, “regulates 
certain aspects of the corporate governance, financial management and 
reporting of Commonwealth authorities, which are in addition to the 
requirements of their enabling legislation; and the corporate governance 
and reporting of Commonwealth companies which are in addition to the 
requirements of the Corporations Act 2001” (DOFA, 2005).   
This paper refers to the Australian National Audit Office’s Better Practice 
Guidelines, along with a number of other Australian and international 
documents and reports on corporate governance.  For example, the 
Higgs Report4 2003, based on the United Kingdom context, is 
considered to be of particular relevance as it was written specifically for 
the guidance of non-executive directors.  This paper also refers to the 
Uhrig report 2003 and the ASX5 Corporate Governance Council 
Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice 
Recommendations.  The paper then discusses the various sections of 
the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997, the primary 
legislation for Commonwealth Statutory Authorities.  Following this 
discussion the paper focuses on institutional theory, the theoretical lens 
used to analyse the empirical data.  The empirical data comprises an 
analysis of the board composition of 19 Commonwealth Statutory 
                                                                                                                   
Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997 (CAC Act) and the 
Corporations Act 2001 (ANAO 2003a, p.10).   
 
4  In April 2002 the UK Secretary of State and the Chancellor appointed Derek 
Higgs to lead a short independent review of the role and effectiveness of non-
executive directors.   
 
5  Australian Stock Exchange 
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Authorities according to certain key criteria.  The paper concludes with a 
summary of this initial research and outlines possible future areas for 
research.   
Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997 (CAC 
Act) 
The Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997 was 
developed to regulate the financial reporting and accountability of 
Commonwealth Statutory Authorities (referred to as CSAs for the 
remainder of this paper) and Commonwealth Companies (referred to as 
CCs for the remainder of this paper).  CSAs are body corporates 
incorporated for a public purpose by an Act or by regulations under an 
Act (CAC Act, ss.7) that hold money on their own account and are 
separate legal entities to the Commonwealth.  CCs are Corporations Act 
20016 companies in which the Commonwealth has a controlling interest 
(ss.34). 
The creation of CSAs and CCs is based on various decisions made by 
government to operate government-controlled entities “outside a 
traditional departmental structure” (Uhrig, 2003 p. 16).  To ensure these 
detached organisations operate effectively and in line with government 
expectations, the majority of CSAs have a governing body such as a 
council or board where the members are defined as directors (CAC Act, 
ss.5).  These directors are selected and appointed by the responsible 
Minister and their role is rather more complex than the role of directors of 
private sector organisations.  CSA directors are subject to the specific 
requirements for directors of private sector companies outlined in the 
Corporations Act 2001.  For example, section 27E of the CAC Act 1997 
states: 
If the directors of a Commonwealth authority delegate a power 
under its enabling legislation, a director is responsible for the 
                                      
6  The Corporations Act 2001 is the principal legislation regulating companies in 
Australia.  It regulates matters such as the formation and operation of companies, 
duties of officers, takeovers and fundraising (APLA, 2007) 
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exercise of the power by the delegate as if the power had been 
exercised by the directors themselves. 
This is comparable to section 198D of the Corporations Act 2001: 
The directors of a company may delegate any of their powers ...  
the exercise of the power by the delegate is as effective as if the 
directors had exercised it. 
The directors of a CSA are required to prepare an annual report that is 
tabled in Parliament and forwarded to the responsible Minister (CAC Act 
1997, ss.9).  In addition, they are also required to prepare budget 
estimates for each financial year (ss.14).  These budget estimates 
contain the proposed annual expenditure of the CSA required to achieve 
the Government-agreed organisational outcomes and are published in 
Portfolio Budget Statements.  The Portfolio Budget Statements are 
referred, via the Government, to one of the Senate’s legislation 
committees for examination and report.  The legislation committees’ 
scrutiny of the estimates provides an opportunity for the Senate to 
assess the performance of the public service and its administration of 
government policy and programs (Evans, 2004).  The review of the 
budget estimates is one of the most important accountability functions of 
the Parliament.  Therefore the directors must not fail to provide the 
responsible Minister with the budget estimates, in the format specified by 
the Department of Finance and Deregulation, and by the required 
deadline.   
Consistent with the requirements for directors of private sector 
companies under the Corporations Act 2001, the directors of CSAs are 
legally required to ensure the financial statements of the organisation 
are audited by an appropriately qualified auditor.  However the directors 
of a CSA do not have the authority to choose an auditor; rather:  
… the directors of a Commonwealth authority must do whatever is 
necessary to ensure that all relevant subsidiary’s financial 
statements are audited by the Auditor-General.  (ss.12.1) 
In support of this requirement the CAC Act 1997 (ss.12.3) states that the 
Auditor-General must provide a copy of the audit report for the 
responsible Minister. 
While directors of both private and public sector entities have 
fundamental differences, they do have similar duties as required by the 
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legislation governing corporations.  The next section of the paper will 
use institutional theory to examine some of these similarities and explore 
some of the differences. 
Institutional Pressures on Public Sector Governance 
Along with the move to “new managerialism”, public sector organisations 
are now under increased pressures “to conform to external expectations 
about what forms or structures are acceptable (or legitimate)” (Hoque, 
2005, p. 370).  The introduction of a governing board of directors in 
CSAs to ‘improve’ their corporate governance is in response to external 
expectations [institutional pressures] to ensure that the public sector 
organisations can remain, or at least be seen to be, legitimate within 
Australian society.   
The institutional pressures which result in organisations changing and 
adopting structures and processes may be explained by institutional 
theory which is defined as “a way of thinking about formal organisation 
structures and … the social processes through which these structures 
develop” (Dillard et al 2004, p. 508).  Institutional pressures – which 
often result in homogeneous organisational structures (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983, p. 147) such as the development and acceptance of 
governing boards as the preferred form of organisational governance 
control – illustrate the concept of isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983, p. 148).   
This paper will focus on institutional isomorphism, which is explained by 
three different mechanisms: coercive, mimetic and normative (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1987; Pollitt, 2001; Dillard et al., 2004).   
Coercive isomorphism results from both formal and informal pressures 
exerted on organisations by other organisations upon which they are 
dependent (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Dillard et al., 2004).  In the 
Commonwealth public sector, the main organisations that apply coercive 
pressure are the three central agencies, the Departments of Finance 
and Deregulation, Treasury and Prime Minister and Cabinet.  These 
central agencies direct many of the processes, practices and policies 
required to be implemented by other government organisations.   
Mimetic isomorphism is a process that takes place when an organisation 
attempts to imitate a more successful organisation (DiMaggio and 
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Powell, 1983, p. 151; Dillard et al., 2004, p. 509).  This view is supported 
by Oliver (1991), who explains that it is expected organisations will 
conform to certain practices when the practices are validated externally 
by other organisations (p. 148).  The move to new managerialism and 
the adoption of processes and practices associated with this new 
managerialism in the public sector could be considered the result of 
mimetic isomorphic processes. 
Normative isomorphism focuses on processes of professionalisation.  
Professional staff undergo relatively uniform training, and then carry the 
ideas they learnt to the different organisations which employ them 
(Pollitt, p. 938).  An example of normative isomorphism is where 
professionally qualified accountants may drive to adopt within their 
organisation new techniques which they learnt in their studies, such as 
activity based costing7 and balanced score card8.   
Institutional theory also suggests that in organisations, in response to 
institutional pressures, there may be significant differences between their 
formal structure and their actual day-to-day work activities (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977, p. 342).  This deliberate act is defined as de-coupling 
however it is important to note that de-coupling is not a mechanism to 
hide dishonest practices but rather it is seen as an attempt to maintain 
some rough equilibrium between inconsistent norms (Brignall and 
Modell, 2000, p. 300).   
Institutional theory offers a satisfying explanation of the move over the 
past decade to a “new managerialism” in the public sector (Jackson and 
Lapsley, 2003, p. 360).  Based on a culture of performance (Hoque and 
Moll, 2001; Boxall, 1998) and an increased focus on accountability, 
efficiency and effectiveness, this new managerialism requires public 
sector organisations to be more responsive to the needs [real and 
perceived] of government (Hoque and Moll, 2001; Boxall, 1998).  Global 
expectations of improved productivity and competitiveness in the public 
                                      
7  A cost accounting system in which costs are assigned to products based on cost 
drivers for the various production activities required to produce a product or 
service (Hoggett, Edwards and Medlin 2006, p. 1107) 
 
8  A measurement-based management system which aligns business activities with 
the vision and strategies of an organisation (Hoggett, Edwards and Medlin 2006, 
p. 1108). 
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sector (Boxall, 1998) have been institutionalised in Australian public 
sector practice.  The following empirical data is reflective of the impact of 
institutional pressures that CSAs have been exposed to in the public 
sector’s misguided path to legitimacy. 
Empirical Tests 
Sample Selection 
There are 71 statutory authorities which are CSAs, according to the 
definition in the CAC Act 1997.  Of these, 25 are defined as material 
entities, as they comprise 99% of revenues, expenses, assets and 
liabilities of all the CSAs (DOFA, 2007).  From the 25 material CSAs, six 
were eliminated, leaving 19 for this review.  The 19 remaining CSAs 
(refer to appendix 1) are part of 11 different Commonwealth government 
portfolios.  The six CSAs eliminated from the study include the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission, which was excluded because it 
operates under the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997. 
The Australian Government Solicitor, Comcare, and the Civil Aviation 
Authority were excluded as they have a “single person at the apex of the 
body rather than a multi-member board” (DOFA, 2007).  The Australian 
Industry Development Corporation and the Coal Mining Industry (Long 
Service Leave Funding) Corporation were also excluded as their 
operations and structure are significantly different from the other CSAs. 
Results 
Number of Directors 
The 19 CSAs in the review had a total of 176 directors, with 
approximately 9 directors per CSA board. This was consistent with the 
findings of the Higgs (2003, p. 22) report, which stated that “the board 
should be of sufficient size that the balance of skills and experience is 
appropriate for the requirement of the business”.  One of the better 
practice recommendations of the Uhrig Report (2003) is that board size 
“should be developed taking into consideration factors such as an 
entity’s size, complexity, risk of operations and the needs of the board”.  
The ASX Corporate Governance Principle 2 recommends that the size of 
the board should be conducive to encouraging expedient and efficient 
decision making (ASX 2003, p. 22).  The Uhrig and Higgs reports, as 
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well as the ASX principles, indicate that board size should be based on 
individual organisational needs rather than a prescribed definite size.  
Another important recommendation of these reports is that the majority 
of directors should be non-executive directors who are generally 
considered to be independent of the executive and “free from any 
business or other relationship which could materially interfere with the 
exercise of their independent judgement” (Higgs, 2003, p. 36).   
In addition to the information about the number of directors, the 2005–06 
Annual Reports for each of the 19 CSAs were used to collect the 
following information: mix of executive and non-executive directors; 
gender of directors; highest level of qualification of directors; average 
length of service of directors; remuneration of non-executive directors; 
and number of other directorships.  This data is presented in the 
following section. 
Mix of Executive and Non Executive Directors 
Of the 176 directors, 15 are executives of the organisation and 161 
(91%) are non-executive directors (NED).  The non-executive director 
does not hold an executive or management position in the organisation 
and could therefore be considered to bring to the board a higher degree 
of independence.  Non-executive directors typically participate in long-
term decision making, contribute external business expertise, identify 
potential business opportunities, and monitor the actions of company 
executives (Pass, 2004, Long et al., 2005; Higgs, 2003).  However, of 
these 161 directors, 23 are also current senior public servants or 
members of parliament and are considered to be non-independent non-
executive directors.  That is, while these directors are not executives of 
the organisation, they have conflicting interests in relation to their 
position on the board in areas such as funding and the setting of the 
strategic direction of the organisation.  For example, Senator George 
Bandis (member of the Government) and Martin Ferguson MP (member 
of the Opposition) are both on the board of the National Library and their 
presence would be to ensure the interests of Parliament are 
represented.  However, as members of different political parties, they 
may need to be excluded from a number of board decisions, such as the 
implementation of government policy, where their roles as members of 
Volume 14, Number 1, 2008 Accounting, Accountability & Performance  
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specific political parties could result in a conflict of role9.  There are 
currently two Departmental Secretaries10 holding directorships on the 
boards of organisations within their portfolios.  These are Ms Lisa Paul, 
Secretary of the Department of Science, Education and Training, and Ms 
Helen Williams, Secretary of the Department of Communications, 
Information Technology and the Arts. Ms Paul is a director on the board 
of the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation, 
which is a CSA within her portfolio.  Ms Helen Williams sits on the 
boards of the National Library of Australia and the Australian Sports 
Commission; again, both of these come under the umbrella of her 
portfolio department.  This high level of non-independent directors was 
criticised in the Uhrig (2003, p. 13) report because representational 
appointments have the potential to place the success of the entity at risk.  
Further, it has been suggested that having the portfolio secretary as a 
member of the board, regardless of whether or not he or she has voting 
rights, is “a further complication, particularly when financial matters are 
at stake” (Howard and Seth-Purdie, 2005, pp. 56–57).  Both Ms Paul 
and Ms Williams assist in preparing and signing-off the Annual Reports 
and Budget Estimates of their CSAs and, as departmental secretaries, 
are required to consider and approve funding requests from these same 
statutory authorities.   
Howard and Seth-Purdie (2005, p. 62) describe this “independence 
paradox” as an interesting position where “a secretary would be 
simultaneously policy advisor to the minister, major client of the authority 
and authority board member”.  They (Howard and Seth-Purdie, 2005, p. 
61) further assert that new public sector non-executive directors who 
come from the private sector initially struggle to come to terms with the 
processes and practices of public sector organisations, as they lack the 
exposure to public sector norms.  This situation contributes to the 
independence paradox, as the non-executive directors, in the course of 
                                      
9  Conflicts of role arise when an officer is required to fulfil multiple roles that may 
be in conflict with each other to some degree.  Unless properly handled, such 
conflicts can impair the quality of working relationships across government 
organisations and lead to a loss of credibility and effectiveness (ANAO 2003c). 
 
10 The Secretary of a Department is responsible for managing [i.e. is head of] the 
Department and must advise the Agency Minister in matters relating to the 
Department (PSA Act 1999, ss. 57.1).  That is, a Secretary is the equivalent of 
the CEO of a private sector organisation. 
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fulfilling their responsibilities, rely heavily on the information and 
guidance provided by the same executives from whom they are to said 















The results from figure 1 are consistent with the recommendations of the 
Higgs report that “at least half of the members of the board, excluding 
the chairman, should be independent non-executive directors” (2003, p. 
35) and the ASX Corporate Governance Principles that “a majority of the 
board should be independent directors” (2003, p. 19). 
Gender of Directors 
The proportion of female non-executive directors (29%) is significantly 
higher than comparable studies of non-executive directors in the private 
sector.  Kang, Cheng and Gray’s 2007 study of the top 100 Australian 
companies in 2003 indicated that 10% of non-executive directors were 
female (p. 200), where Cortese and Bowrey’s 2007 study of the top 50 
Australian listed companies in 2006 found 16% were female.  
Even more significant than the larger proportion of female non-executive 
directors is the fact that all statutory authority boards in the study had 
one or more female non-executive directors.  The Kang, Cheng and 
Gray study showed in 2003 that, of the top 100 Australian companies, 
67% had a female director (p. 200) while the Cortese and Bowrey 2007 
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study indicated 83% of the top 50 Australian listed companies had one 
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Along with gender, age is also a much measured characteristic of 
directors of boards.  The Cortese and Bowrey (2007) and the Kang, 
Cheng and Gray (2007) studies both measure and discuss the age mix 
of directors; however, unlike the annual reports of private sector 
companies, the annual reports of CSAs do not disclose the ages of the 
directors.  The ethnicity of directors is also not explicitly disclosed in the 
annual reports.  This information would be useful in determining the level 
of representation of the various minority groups in society, which in turn 
would demonstrate the breadth of accountability to the Australian public. 
Directors’ Levels of Education 
The level of education of 113 directors could be determined from the 
various CSAs’ annual reports (64% of the sample).  Figure 3 shows the 














It is apparent from the data that most directors have some level of 
tertiary qualifications.  Of the directors with post graduate qualifications, 
a significant proportion (25%) have been awarded PhDs, with the 
remainder holding Masters degrees and/or professional qualifications 
such as CPA Australia status.  This result can be explained due to the 
normative isomorphic process where the selection of appropriate people 
to become non-executive directors is guided by their level of perceived 
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suitability, based on their qualifications and membership of particular 
organisations. 
Length of Service 
The length of service of non-executive directors has also been identified 
as a possible key indicator of board performance and the level of 
director independence.  The ASX listing rules suggest that non-
executive directors should serve on a board only for a period of time 
where it would not interfere with the director’s ability to act in the best 
interests of the company (ASX, 2003, p. 20).  This view is reflected in 
Uhrig’s (2003, p. 53) report, which suggested a maximum board service 
period be set to allow for appropriate rotation of directors.  Higgs (2003, 
p. 53) concluded that non-executive directors could appropriately serve 
two three-year terms with a company and suggested that it would be of 
questionable value for a non-executive director to serve a longer term as 





Figure 4 shows the average length of service of non-executive directors 
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findings of the comparable study of ASX 50 corporations (Cortese and 
Bowrey, 2007).  There is, however, some concern, as approximately 8% 
of the non-executive directors in the sample have served as non-
executive directors on their respective boards for 10 or more years.  This 
length of service could present problems, particularly in relation to the 
independence of non-executive directors, since “the substantial length of 
time served by some non-executive directors could reasonably be 
perceived to interfere with the independence of these board members” 
(ASX, 2003, p. 20). 
Director Remuneration 
The most obvious difference between non-executive directors of CSAs 
and of private sector companies is the level of remuneration for non-
executive directors.  Cortese and Bowrey (2007) found that the majority 
of the ASX 50 companies provided their non-executive directors with 
average remuneration in excess of $140,000.  Figure 5 shows that the 
majority (68%) of non-executive directors in the sample received 
remuneration between $15,000 and $45,000 per year, with the average 
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Excluded from the above figure is the average level of remuneration for 
the non-executive directors of the Reserve Bank of Australia board.  This 
is because the Reserve Bank of Australia’s 2005–06 Annual Report 
discloses in the financial notes (Note 12, p. 85) only the consolidated 
remuneration of key management personnel, which includes the 
Governor and Deputy Governor, eight non-executive Reserve Bank of 
Australia’s Board members, five non-executive Payments System Board 
members and five senior staff.  Even though the Reserve Bank of 
Australia is a statutory authority operating under the CAC Act 1997, it 
was not possible to identify separately the remuneration of its board 
members.  This lack of clear disclosure of director remuneration of the 
Reserve Bank of Australia is not in accordance with ASX Corporate 
Governance Principle 9 (ASX, 2003), which requires the disclosure of 
non-executive directors’ remuneration to be clear and adequately 
distinguished from the remuneration structure applied to company 
executives.   
Also not included in Figure 5 is the remuneration of the non-executive 
directors who are also senior public servants and members of 
parliament, as they do not receive any remuneration for their 
directorships on statutory authorities boards.  This is generally made 
clear in the Notes to the Financial Statements.  For example, the 
National Library of Australia 2005–06 Annual Report Note 13 (p. 115) 
states “Parliamentary members of Council do not receive any 
remuneration from the Library for their service on Council”. 
The average remuneration of non-executive directors who had been a 
director for one year was $29,000, while those who had been a director 
for six or more years was $31,000, indicating no correlation between 
non-executive director remuneration and the length of time they serve on 
the boards of material CSAs.   
Number of Directorships  
The data collected in Figure 6 shows that 84 directors of statutory 
authorities (48% of the sample) held at least one other directorship, with 
70 (43%) of non-executive directors holding more than one directorship.   
However, of all the directors in the sample, only five held at least one 
other directorship with another material statutory authority.  Two of these 
were non-independent non-executive directors: Mr Mark Paterson, 
Secretary of the Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources (DITR) 
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and Ms Helen Williams, Secretary of the Department of 
Communications, Information Technology and the Arts (DCITA).  This 
relatively high percentage (43%) of non-executive directors holding at 
least one directorship in both the private and the public sectors tends to 
indicate that the non-executive directors of CSAs are able to contribute a 
significant amount of private sector corporate experience to the boards 
of CSAs.  This is a clear example of both how institutional pressures to 
have access to the CSAs and how mimetic and normative isomorphic 
processes are in a position to be internally exerted.  It could also be 
considered that this level of ‘private sector’ experienced non-executive 
directors will contribute to legitimising the existence, role and 
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The boards of directors of CSAs are unique in a number of ways when 
compared to the boards of private sector organisations.  On the surface 
they appear similar, for example their size and composition, but beneath 
the surface are a range of different characteristics and requirements.  
The initial surface similarities could be explained by institutional theory 
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as the result of coercive isomorphic processes, with the CAC Act 1997 
specifying certain governance requirements of CSAs.  In the private 
sector there is a definite drive to increase the proportion of non-
executive directors to improve the level of, or at least the appearance of, 
independence of the board from the management of the organisation11.  
However, independence does not appear to be a characteristic either 
required or encouraged of directors in statutory authorities.   
The findings from this study indicate that the proportion of non-executive 
directors on the governing boards of directors in CSAs is comparable to 
if not higher than public corporation boards, and therefore these public 
sector organisations could actually be perceived as being more 
compliant with the ASX’s Principles of Good Corporate Governance.  
However in reality the responsible Minister selects and appoints (or 
recommends for appointment) governing board members, which negates 
the independence of these public sector governing board directors.  The 
high level of institutional pressure from the responsible Minister supports 
the notion that the public sector has adopted this governance structure 
from the private sector, not to improve corporate governance, but to 
legitimise the organisations in the sector.   
This institutional pressure from the Minister also results in the de-
coupling of the governance structure, as the board appears to be 
relatively highly independent, due to the presence of a high proportion of 
non-executive directors [who are usually considered independent].  
However, because they are appointed by those who are not independent 
of the CSA, the reality of their existence is different from the appearance 
they present.  So why the need for de-coupling? The answer seems to 
be the wholesale adoption of new managerialism philosophy in the 
public sector.  The myth that private sector practices, for example the 
ASX’s Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice 
Recommendations, are required if the public sector is to operate 
efficiently and effectively.  The inclusion of governing boards of directors 
in the corporate governance structures of public sector organisations 
appears to be in line with Boxall’s explanation that the main objectives of 
new managerialism are the encouragement of a culture of [board and 
                                      
11 Principle 2 of the ASX’s 2003 Corporate Governance Council Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations outlines the 
suggested structure of the board of directors such as composition, size and 
commitment to adequately discharge its responsibilities and duties (ASX, 2003).  
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organisational] performance (1998, p. 18) and the perceived need of the 
public sector to improve its accountability (Guthrie, 1998, p. 2; Barton, 
2005, p. 138).  Yet the de-coupling of the governing board of directors 
with the authority and power of the responsible Minister seems to imply 
that government itself does not trust the operation and function of the 
governing board of directors which it has adopted from the private 
sector. 
Besides having executive and non-executive directors, some boards of 
CSAs also include non-independent non-executive directors who are 
literally representational directors.  These directors are either senior 
public servants or members of parliament.  Their role is to represent the 
government or parliament and to protect the interests of these bodies, 
rather than to participate independently in the governance of the CSA.  
Their presence may be explained as a function of the coercive 
isomorphic process.   
In addition to appointing board members, the responsible Minister can 
also direct the board to comply with general government policies (ss.28 
of the CAC Act 1997) as well as determine the overall strategy of the 
CSA (Uhrig, 2003, p. 35).  This creates a situation where there is very 
little real independence and autonomy of the board.  Uhrig (2003, p. 23) 
commented that the power to act is essential to a board’s ability to 
govern effectively.  However, due to the powers of the responsible 
Minister, it appears that the boards of CSAs are not able to govern 
effectively as they do not have the power to act with autonomy.   
There is no doubt corporate governance structures are critical in the 
public sector; however, as the environment is so different to the private 
sector, the need for and value of similar governance arrangements is 
questionable.  Why adopt private sector governance practices when 
some of the most spectacular corporate collapses have occurred 
recently in spite of their governance structures? It could be argued that 
the presence of implementing similar governance arrangements is based 
on the misconception that the private sector is more efficient and 
effective, rather than on improving public sector governance.  The Uhrig 
Report (2003) suggested that CSAs focused on regulating or service 
delivery objectives would be better served having a Chief Executive 
Officer reporting directly to the Minister rather than a board.  Bartos 
(2005) reflected that, should the Uhrig model be accepted, many 
statutory authorities including Commonwealth Scientific Industrial 
Research Organisation, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Special 
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Broadcasting Services Corporation, National Gallery, National Library, 
National Museum and Australian War Memorial (p. 97) would no longer 
have a board.  However, at present these statutory authorities still have 
governing boards.  The continuing presence of governing boards in 
these public sector organisations can be considered to be the result of 
the impact of various institutional pressures which have been placed on 
the CSAs, with the goal of contributing to the legitimacy of the board for 
both the government and Australian public. 
Conclusion 
It can be argued that the adoption of private sector practices by the 
public sector can be seen, not as an attempt to improve efficiency, 
effectiveness and performance, which are the objectives of the new 
managerialism in the public sector, but rather as a need for public sector 
organisations to legitimise themselves within society (Hoque, 2005, p. 
370).  The strong belief that private sector organisational practices and 
structures are superior to public sector practices and structures has led 
to various institutional pressures being exerted, both internal and 
externally, on public sector organisations, with a mix of results.  One 
such institutional pressure is the belief that good corporate governance 
is based on the presence of a governing board consisting of a particular 
mix of directors.   
This study has shown that the majority of CSAs have a governing board 
consisting of both executive and non-executive directors, which is 
consistent with private sector organisations.  Indeed, based on the data 
above, the boards of CSAs appear to be more in line with the 
recommendations from bodies such as the Australian Stock Exchange 
than private sector organisations are.  However, while it appears the 
presence of CSA governing boards should improve the corporate 
governance of the organisations, and in turn increase their legitimacy in 
this era of new managerialism, the structures behind the boards and the 
legislated roles of the directors contradict some of these aspects, such 
as independence.  The increased legitimacy of these CSAs, associated 
with the presence of governing boards, can be considered as a part of 
the de-coupling mechanism that persists throughout the public sector.  
That is, while these CSRs have governing boards that undertake many 
of the roles of private sector boards, the real power to set the strategic, 
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financial and operational directions of the CSRs is not in the hands of 
the directors but in the hands of the responsible ministers.   
This study has drawn data from the boards of “material” CSAs.  Further 
research could extend this study to include the board compositions of 
non-material statutory authorities.  This would be particularly interesting, 
as materiality is defined according to the value of assets and liabilities 
and not to the social value of the services provided.  As these 
organisations operate in the same environment as the material CSAs, it 
would be interesting to examine whether the financial situation of 
organisations influences the composition of their governing boards or 
whether there are other influencing factors at play. 
A future research project could perform an analysis of the changing 
board structures of the material CSAs since the enactment of the CAC 
Act 1997.  Such a research project would provide an interesting account 
of the impact of this Act in line with the public sector’s move to new 
managerialism and the corresponding increased focus on public sector 
organisation performance. 
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Statutory Authorities Included in the Analysis 
 
Statutory Authority Portfolio 
Grains Research and Development 
Corporation 
Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Forestry 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) Communications, Information 
Technology and the Arts 
Australian Postal Corporation Communications, Information 
Technology and the Arts 
Australian Sports Commission Communications, Information 
Technology and the Arts 
National Gallery of Australia Communications, Information 
Technology and the Arts 
National Library of Australia Communications, Information 
Technology and the Arts 
National Museum of Australia Communications, Information 
Technology and the Arts 
Special Broadcasting Service Corporation 
(SBS) 
Communications, Information 
Technology and the Arts 
Defence Housing Australia (DHA) Defence 
Australian Nuclear Science and Technology 
Organisation (ANSTO) 
Education, Science and Training 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial 
Research Organisation (CSIRO) 
Education, Science and Training 
Indigenous Business Australia Employment and Workplace 
Relations 
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Statutory Authority Portfolio 
Export Finance and Insurance Corporation Foreign Affairs and Trade 
Australian Hearing Services Human Services 
Tourism Australia Industry, Tourism and 
Resources 
Australian Reinsurance Pool Corporation Treasury 
Reserve Bank of Australia Treasury 
Australian War Memorial Veteran’s Affairs 
Airservices Australia Transport and Regional Services 




The Uhrig Report 2003 – 
Summary of Better Practice Guidance for Boards 
 
1. Board size should be developed taking into consideration factors 
such as an entity’s size, complexity, risk of operations and the 
needs of the board. 
2. Committees are a useful mechanism for the board to enhance its 
effectiveness through further detailed oversight and supervision of 
the management of risks that are critical to the success of the 
entity.  Committees should be used only for this purpose. 
3. In getting the best from boards, appropriately experienced 
directors are critical to good governance. 
4. Representational appointments to boards have the potential to 
place the success of the entity at risk. 
5. Responsible Ministers should issue appointment letters detailing 
government expectations of directors. 
6. Maximum board service periods allow for a structured rotation of 
directors. 
7. All boards should have orientation programs and directors should 
have the opportunity for ongoing professional development. 
8. Annual assessments of the board need to occur to ensure 
government gets the best from the board. 
